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UID:MEC-018b59ce1fd616d874afad0f44ba338d@soh.hku.hk
DTSTART:20181025T080000Z
DTEND:20181025T093000Z
DTSTAMP:20181023T043300Z
CREATED:20181023
LAST-MODIFIED:20181023
SUMMARY:Department of Philosophy
DESCRIPTION:Reasons for Reliabilism
 
Bob Beddor
National University of Singapore
 
Abstract:
One approach to justification comes from the reliabilist tradition, which maintains that a belief is justified provided that it is reliably formed. Another comes from the ‘Reasons First’ tradition, which claims that a belief is justified provided that it is based on reasons that support it. These two approaches are typically developed in isolation from each other; this essay motivates and defends a synthesis. On the view proposed here, justification is understood in terms of an agent’s reasons for belief, which are in turn analyzed along reliabilist lines: an agent’s reasons for belief are the states that serve as inputs to their reliable processes. I show that this ‘Reasons First Reliabilism’ allows each tradition to profit from the other’s explanatory resources. It enables reliabilists to explain epistemic defeat, and it enables Reasons Firsters to give a predictive and naturalistic epistemology.
Thursday, 25 October
4:00 – 5:30 pm Room 10.27 Run Run Shaw Tower
Centennial Campus
University of Hong Kong
For inquiries: Jennifer Nado (nado@hku.hk)
URL:https://soh.hku.hk/events/reasons-for-reliabilism/
LOCATION:Room 10.27, Run Run Shaw Tower, Centennial Campus, HKU
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://soh.hku.hk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/20181025_Philosophy_Reasons_for_Reliabilism_Bob_Beddor.jpg
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