20190117_Philosophy_A_realistic_argument_for_scientific_realism

Location

Room 10.27 RRST
Room 10.27, Run Run Shaw Tower, Centennial Campus, HKU

Date

Jan 17 2019

Time

4:00 pm - 5:30 pm

Labels

Department of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy

A realistic argument for scientific realism

 

Samuel Kahn
Wuhan University

 

In this paper I provide a novel argument for scientific realism (SR). In contrast to most recent defenses of SR, my defense of SR does not rely on the no-miracles argument (NMA). Instead, I take a more unconventional approach: I focus on the different kinds of justification available to different individuals in relation to different kinds of propositions. I maintain that this alternative focus shows that most people are warranted in believing many propositions about unobservables.

The paper is divided into three main sections. In the first, I rehearse the main moves in the recent debate about SR. In the second, I argue that the discussion in section one enables us to see that most of the arguments in the recent debate about SR mistake their target: instead of being about SR, they are about meta-SR. I argue that what I call the JJ-principle should be rejected and, further, that if the JJ-principle is rejected, then meta-SR may be cleaved from SR. This enables me to advance to a position I call thin realism in the third and final section of the paper.

Thursday, January 17
4:00-5:30pm

Room 10.27 Run Run Shaw Tower
Centennial Campus
University of Hong Kong

For inquiries: Jennifer Nado (nado@hku.hk)

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