Department of Philosophy

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

SEMINAR

Third-Factor Responses to Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism

Wang Qin
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen)

Abstract:
Take moral realism to be the view that we sometimes have true beliefs about objective moral truths. Evolutionary debunkers think that moral realism runs into serious epistemic problems. They claim that, given the fact that our moral beliefs are thoroughly influenced by evolutionary forces that work without regard to truth, moral realists cannot explain why our moral beliefs would ever be reliable. Some realists claim to have found a solution to this epistemic problem. They argue that, given certain substantive moral assumptions, we should expect evolutionary forces to push us toward true moral beliefs. A third factor grounds the moral truths and causes our moral beliefs. Call this kind of response to evolutionary debunking “third-factor responses”. These realists think that they are entitled to the substantive moral assumptions, because the evolutionary debunking arguments also make substantive moral assumptions.

I argue that this feeling of entitlement to assumptions is misguided. It is a mistake to think that one is automatically entitled to whatever one’s dialectic opponent assumed. Opposing sides in a debate are not necessarily entitled to the same assumptions. One is entitled to assume, if only for the sake of argument, what one’s opponent accepts, but not entitled to assume what one’s opponent denies, questions, or is only accepting elsewhere for the sake of argument. In this case, the realists mistakenly believed that they
are entitled to the substantive moral assumptions because debunkers made the same assumptions elsewhere. But if the principle about differential entitlement to assumptions is correct, then the realists are not entitled to what the debunkers assume in this debate.

For inquiries: Jennifer Nado (nado@hku.hk)

Thursday, 1 November
4:00 – 5:30 pm Room 10.27 Run Run Shaw Tower
Centennial Campus