Department of Philosophy

Reasons for Reliabilism

Bob Beddor
National University of Singapore

Abstract:
One approach to justification comes from the reliabilist tradition, which maintains that a belief is justified provided that it is reliably formed. Another comes from the ‘Reasons First’ tradition, which claims that a belief is justified provided that it is based on reasons that support it. These two approaches are typically developed in isolation from each other; this essay motivates and defends a synthesis. On the view proposed here, justification is understood in terms of an agent’s reasons for belief, which are in turn analyzed along reliabilist lines: an agent’s reasons for belief are the states that serve as inputs to their reliable processes. I show that this ‘Reasons First Reliabilism’ allows each tradition to profit from the other’s explanatory resources. It enables reliabilists to explain epistemic defeat, and it enables Reasons Firsters to give a predictive and naturalistic epistemology.

Thursday, 25 October
4:00 – 5:30 pm Room 10.27 Run Run Shaw Tower
Centennial Campus
University of Hong Kong

For inquiries: Jennifer Nado (nado@hku.hk)