Department of Philosophy

ONLINE JOINT SEMINAR

The University of Hong Kong
Lingnan University
National University of Singapore
Justin Snedegar
University of St. Andrews

Dismissing Blame

Zoom link: https://hku.zoom.us/j/92448586439?pwd=amJPTmpReUdzYkZCbXFhUnFwcms3Zz09

Abstract:
When someone blames you, you might accept the blame or you might reject it, challenging the blamer’s interpretation of the facts, or providing a justification or excuse. Either way, there are opportunities for edifying moral discussion and moral repair. But another common, and less constructive, response is to simply dismiss the blame, refusing to engage with the blamer. Even if you agree that you are blameworthy, you may refuse to engage with the blame—and in particular, with blame coming from this particular person. This paper aims to make sense of this kind of response: what are we doing when we dismiss blame? A common thought is that we dismiss demands issued by blame, but we still must identify the content of the relevant demands. My proposal is that when we dismiss blame, we dismiss a demand to respond to the blame with a second-personal expression of remorse to the blamer.

For inquiries:
Nathaniel Sharadin
sharadin@hku.hk